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Ethics of re-hearsing procedures on a corpse
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, Tex
You are the attending surgeon of a homeless pedestrian who sustained multiple injuries when struck by a car. He died
soon after being brought to the emergency department. It is late in the evening. A first-year resident and amedical student
have been helping with the failed attempt at resuscitation. The emergency department is empty, except for your case. A
central line kit lies on the bed, opened but not used. The junior resident asks your permission for herself and the student
to practice the technique of subclavian cauterization and tracheal intubation on the fresh cadaver to get a “feel” for the
procedures. There is no medical simulation for these procedures at your medical center. The best ethical response is:
A. Tell them to go ahead and practice.
B. They can only practice intubation because it leaves no external wounds.
C. You should supervise them yourself to assure educational benefit.
D. They should wait until you get permission from the medical examiner.
E. The present case is not appropriate for educational purposes.
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aInformation’s pretty thin stuff unless mixed with experi-
ence.
Clarence Shepard Day, Jr
William Osler, a giant in establishing modern clinical
medicine, described the twofold need for knowledge and
experience in medical education. However, Osler’s “going
to sea” analogy compares the need for knowledge as with-
out books one would “sail uncharted seas,” while, studying
without patients, thereby not accumulating experience,
students would “not go to sea at all.” Students and resi-
dents are taught procedures from the doing; reading about
how to do a procedure is a meager substitute for doing a
procedure. Doing procedures are candy to surgery resi-
dents; the more complex the procedure, the more it is
coveted.
There is a fundamental difference between knowing
something and knowing how to do something. Physicians
performing procedures must do both, but the surgeon’s
real value lies in responsible doing. One component of
responsible doing is knowledgeable doing, the attainment
of which requires appropriately supervised learning. An-
other component is respectful doing, which includes show-
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nd obtaining consent when it is ethically required to do so.
his second component is essential for reliable professional
ormation during training.
Nowhere in medicine is experience so important as in
urgery. Many surgical outcomes worsen when surgeons’
aseloads fall below certain levels.1 This is especially true in
ardiovascular procedures.2 Surgeons go to great efforts to
educe harmful effects of learning curves, especially learn-
ng curves of trainees. The coin of the realm in surgery is
nowledgeable, respectful experience.
Practicing procedures on the fresh corpse would pro-
ide hands-on experience without the danger of injuring a
iving patient. The newly dead would provide the best
imulator possible, with feedback from return of blood on
ntry into the subclavian vein, and the feel of once living
issue persists for some time. Also, fewer ethical problems
re associated with practicing on the newly dead than with
racticing on the nearly dead during resuscitations.3 Hav-
ng left the operating room many years ago to tell a patient’s
amily the patient had expired, only to be caught by a
esident reporting a revitalization, one of us (J.W.J.)
earned to question the wisdom of assumptions that nearly
ead is always truly dead.
Legally, permission is required for possession of human
emains and their transportation. Admittedly, sometime
efore a century ago standards were loose and grave rob-
ers had their day, but by the mid-1800s, every medical
chool was required to have donation of a cadaver by a legal
gent before it was used for teaching or research. The
ttending physician is invested with no legal or moral rights
egarding the disposition of the deceased’s remains.
879
p
b
o
o
t
t
m
i
t
p
b
d
f
e
c
p
l
O
d
t
h
t
t
c
i
d
m
n
i
m
d
R
1
2
3
4
5
JOURNAL OF VASCULAR SURGERY
September 2011880 Jones and McCulloughNotwithstanding, there is an argument for practicing
procedures on fresh cadavers. A dead person, however, is
no longer a person and does not retain premortem auton-
omy. In fact, death is the end of personhood and of the
associated rights. The dead have no autonomy; there is no
need for something that cannot be applied. Even the reli-
gious argument that the person exists as spirit is hollow: a
spirit has no need of the material world or rights therein.
Bertrand Russell, arguably the smartest atheist ever, makes
the point bluntly by declaring that saying a person exists
after dying is like saying a cricket club exists after all its
members have passed on. The dead cannot be harmed, so
what’s the ethical fuss?
The ethical fuss originates elsewhere. Trainees can be
harmed in their professional formation by acting in ways
that show disrespect for fresh cadavers, just as they can be
harmed by disrespectful behaviors toward cadavers in the
gross anatomy laboratory in the first year of medical school.
Practicing procedures on the newly dead without authori-
zation teaches trainees to put their own self-interest first,
rather than their obligations to patient’s families, thus
undermining proper professional formation as fiduciaries.
This is disrespectful of dead patients and therefore not
benign in the context of professional formation.
There is a possibility of collateral harm. The dead’s
nonexistence causes changes of the living, termed “Cam-
bridge changes.”4 “Moreover, Cambridge changes also
involve beliefs, hopes, fears and expectations.” A wife be-
comes a widow and has expectations and beliefs about how
the deceased’s body should be treated. Thus, the obligation
to respect a moral agent’s wishes passes to the next of kin.
And no training or research, invasive or not, should be
started using the deceased’s body or fluids without next of
kin’s permission after informed consent for that usage.5
The informed consent process should be sufficiently de-
tailed so that next of kin understand what they are being
asked to authorize and include identification of the trainees
and their supervisor.
Finally, medical education can be harmed. Medical
educators should be committed to the professional forma-
tion of trainees. Lack of consent for training on the newly
dead does indeed threaten the moral integrity of medical
education.
Option B is the least appropriate choice, twice over
because B smacks of deceitful intent in addition to lack of
permission. Whether the procedure leaves external marks
has no ethical relevance. The requirements for permission
are essentially the same whether or not epithelial surfaces
are penetrated. Thus, there is good ethical reasoning for
6rohibiting the unconsented practice of endotracheal intu-
ation, and a number of European medical societies have
utlawed the practice.6 Undertaking such a practice with-
ut pedagogically required supervision violates the intellec-
ual integrity of medical education.
Without proper supervision, the educational value of
wo inexperienced trainees practicing procedures is mini-
al.3 Supervision or lack of it should be mentioned in the
nformed consent process to obtain permission when rela-
ives are available. Option C should be a given, to only
artially remedy the egregious failings of options A and B,
ut is not a choice of how to proceed.
The medical examiner’s authority is strictly limited to
ecisions necessary to determine the cause of death; aside
rom forensic procedures, pathologists are without interest,
xpertise, or authority. After autopsies or other testing are
ompleted, governmental social service determines the dis-
osition of unclaimed bodies. Because no relatives can be
ocated initially does not mean that they won’t appear later.
ption D is ruled out.
Practicing procedures, even minor ones, on recently
eceased corpses was standard practice in busy public
eaching hospitals but has gradually waned as simulators
ave developed. The deceased will likely require a postmor-
em examination, and there is a small chance that the added
rauma of subclavian cauterization and tracheal intubation
ould complicate the determination of cause of death. Most
mportantly, there is no permission, and having no imme-
iate source does not entirely satisfy the ethical require-
ent for permission. Option E is the wise choice. Having
othing to stop an action, in the dark side of human nature,
s a historical invitation to cross moral boundaries by weak-
inded individuals and nations alike, casting, at times,
oubt upon the fundamental goodness of human nature.
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